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SIT-INS: PROCEED WITH CAUTION
CamuuEs E. RICE*
In the current racial contentions, the sit-in demonstration has proved
to be an effective and disturbing weapon against segregation by pri-
vately-owned business establishments. It is effective because the imposi-
tion of economic loss, through monopolizing the seats in a restaurant
to the exclusion of potential customers, can break down a proprietor's
pattern of segregation more relentlessly than persuasion. It is disturbing
because the sit-in poses a direct challenge to accustomed understanding of
private property rights.
On May 20, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
five important sit-in cases. In Peterson v. Gieenville,i the Court reversed
trespass convictions of sit-in demonstrators in a store in Greenville, South
Carolina, which city had an ordinance requiring hotels, boarding houses,
restaurants and the like to furnish "separate facilities" for "white persons
and colored persons." The majority of the Court, speaking through the
Chief Justice, held that the manager of the store was "left with no choice
of his own" because of the existence of the ordinance. The restaurant dis-
crimination, therefore, was in fact imposed by the ordinance and this
constituted sufficient participation by the state to bring into operation the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice
Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in which he chided the majority for
leaving no room for a showing that the discrimination was indeed the
private choice of the store manager uninfluenced by the ordinance. In
the particular case, however, Mr. Justice Harlan found that the manager
was in fact influenced by the ordinance, and so he concurred in the reversal
of the conviction.
In Gober v. Bimingham,2 the Court reversed, per curiam, criminal
trespass convictions of department store sit-ins in Birmingham, which
also had an ordinance requiring segregation. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented
in part because he doubted whether, under Alabama procedure, the issue
*Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University; A.B., Holy Cross, 1953;
LL.B., Boston College, 1956; LL.M., New York University, 1959, J.S.D., 1962.
1. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
2. 373 U.S. 374 (1963).
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of the ordinance was properly raised. In Shkuttleswortk v. Birminghamj,3
the Court reversed the convictions of two Negro ministers for inciting the
sit-in demonstrations which had been held in the Gober case to be un-
punishable. Chief Justice Warren, for the majority, observed that "there
can be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent
act."' Mr. Justice Harlan dissented because the influence of the Birmingham
segregation ordinance on the case! was unclear and because "I do not think
it can be said that the record lacks evidence of incitement of 'sit-ins' other
than those involved in Gober."'
In Avent v. NortA Carolna6 the Court vacated the trespass convictions
of restaurant sit-ins in Durham, North Carolina, where there also was a
segregation ordinance, and remanded the case to the state court for con-
sideration in light of Peterson v. Greenville. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented
in part, because of his disagreement with the premises of Peterson.
The fifth case, Lombard v. Louisana,7 involved sit-ins at a lunch
counter in the McCrory store in New Orleans, but it was unlike the other
four in that neither New Orelans nor Louisiana had any ordinance or
statute requiring segregated eating facilities. Rather, the Court, speaking
again through the Chief Justice, found sufficient state action in public
announcements by the Mayor and the Superintendent of Police of New
Orleans which directed the demonstrations to be halted and which went
beyond the nondiscriminatory exhortations to preserve the peace which
would have been permissible. Thus, said the Court, "the store officials'
actions were coerced by the city."8 Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, asserting
his belief that any "place of public accommodation under license from the
State" " is an instrumentality of the state and bound as fully as the state
by the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Harlan
dissented, finding instead that the statements by the Major and the
Superintendent of Police did not mandate a continuation of segregation
but "are more properly read as an effort by these two officials to preserve
the peace in what they might reasonably have regarded as a highly charged
atmosphere."1o
3. 373 U.S. 262 (1963).
4. Id. at 265.
5. 373 U.S. at 259.
6. 373 U.S. 37 (1963).
7. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
8. Id. at 273.
9. Id. at 281.
10. 373 U.S. at 254.
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The Court in these five sit-in cases decided in effect that in no city
where segregation is a matter of ordinance, statute or public policy can
Negroes be prosecuted for trying to get service at stores or restaurants.
There remains undecided the issue whether a privately-owned restaurant
or other place of public accommodation, in a city where there is no
ordinance, statute or public policy of segregation, can choose its cus-
tomers on the basis of race. In the October, 1963, Term of the Supreme
Court, cases involving this question were scheduled to be heard.-
If the Court is to invalidate discriminatory practices in privately-
owned public accommodations, it will probably do so in reliance upon the
Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868.12
11. See Bell v. Maryland, 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962), cert. granted,
374 U.S. 805 (1963); Griffin v. Maryland, 225 Md. 422, 171 A.2d 717 (1961), cert.
granted, 370 U.S. 935 (1962), restored to calendar for reargsment, 373 U.S. 920
(1963); Drews v. Maryland, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961), appeal pending,
368 U.S. 894 (1961); Boule v. Columbia, 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962),
cert. granted, 374 U.S. 805 (1963); Barr v. Columbia, 239 S.C. 395, 123 S.E.2d 521
(1961), cert. granted, 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
12. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States ac-
cording to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years
of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any. office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as
a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support
the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebel-
lion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the
loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such .debts, obligations and claims shag1
be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
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That amendment, however, was construed in 1883 to prohibit only
state action and not action by individuals1s The Civil Rights Act of 1875
provided in its first section:
... That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations estab-
lished by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.-
The second section of the law made it a penal offense for any person
to deny to any citizen any of the accommodations or privileges mentioned
in the first section, "except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of
every race and color." The Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases's
held the act unconstitutional because it sought to prevent discriminatory
acts by private individuals whereas the Fourteenth Amendment, for the
enforcement of which the act was passed, prohibited only state action and
not the actions of individuals. Section 5 of the amendment, therefore,
which granted Congress power to enforce the amendment by appropriate
legislation,
does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress
against the operation of State laws, and the action of State
officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment.16
Mr. Justice Bradley, for the majority of the Court, observed:
If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions
of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why
may not Congress with equal show of authority enact a code of
laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life,
liberty, and property?17
Nor, held the Court, did the Thirteenth Amendment,18 which abolished
slavery, confer such power upon Congress. The denial by a proprietor of
13. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
15. Supra note 13.
16. Supra note 13, at 11.
17. Supra note 13, at 14.
18. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
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a privately-owned inn, public conveyance or theatre of service to a cus-
tomer on racial grounds is not such a badge of servitude as to be encom-
passed within the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment, even though
that amendment interdicted the actions of individuals as well as states."'
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in the Civil Rigkts Cases, and criticized
the majority for sacrificing "the substance and spirit" of the Fourteenth
Amendment "by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism? 2 0 The Thirteenth
Amendment, he also said, gave Congress the power to eradicate all "bur-
dens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery and servitude, '1 21
and discriminatory exclusion from inns, public conveyances, and places
of public amusement may be thus forbidden. Moreover, he asserted, the
Fourteenth Amendment, in making the Negroes citizens of the United
States and of their respective states, brought them "within the direct
operation of that provision of the Constitution which declares that 'the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States.' Art 4, § 2.' 122 That citizenship granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment may be protected, reasoned Mr. Justice Har-
lan, "by Congressional legislation of a primary character" 23 and not merely
by legislation directed only to the rectification of state action. He found
an exemption from racial discrimination in public accommodations to be
an immunity of that citizenship which may be so protected by Congres-
sional legislation directly operative against individuals. 24 Nor would the
sustaining of Congressional power to prohibit racial discrimination in
public accommodations necessarily imply a power in Congress to enact a
municipal code "covering every matter affecting the life, liberty, and prop-
19. Supra note 13, at 20-23. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, enacted pursuant
to the thirteenth amendment over President Johnson's veto, guaranteed to all
persons, regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude, the same right
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,
as is enjoyed by white citizens." 14 Stat. 27 (1866); see BIDDLE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE FEDERAL LAW IN SAFEGUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY TODAY 120 (1945).
20. Supra note 13, at 26.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 46.
23. Ibid.
24. See Neil v. Delaware, 104 U.S. 370 (1881); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Whitefield v. Ohio,
297 U.S. 431 (1936); see also McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894);
Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492 (1890); Chambers v. B. & 0. R. Co., 207 U.S. 142(1907); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The apparently settled inter-
pretation of article 4, section 2, however, is that it merely forbids a state to dis-
criminate against citizens of other states in favor of its own.
1964]
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erty of the citizens of the several States,"25 since the right to be free from
such racial discrimination is a right created by the Fourteenth Amendment
and therefore within the ambit of Congressional power to enforce, whereas
the states retain exclusive power to protect the general run of civil rights
which are not derived from the Thirteenth, Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. 26
The Harlan dissent foreshadowed the later views of Mr. Justice
Douglas2 7 in declaring that:
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforce-
ment of the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keep-
ers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents
or instrumentalities of the State, because they are charged with
duties to the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties
and functions, to governmental regulation ...
. . . What I affirm is that no State, nor the officers of any
State, nor any corporation or individual wielding power under
State authority for the public benefit or the public convenience,
can, consistently either with the freedom established by the fun-
damental law, or with that equality of civil rights which now be-
longs to every citizen, discriminate against freemen or citizens, in
those rights, because of their race, or because they once labored
under the disabilities of slavery, imposed upon them as a race.28
Again the Harlan dissent presaged a modern-day approach in sug-
gesting that the commerce clause empowers Congress to enforce non-dis-
criminatory access to some public accommodations:
I suggest, that it -may become a pertinent inquiry Whether Con-
gress may, in the exertion of its power to regulate commerce among
the States, enforce among passengers on public conveyances, equal-
ity of right, without regard to race, color .or previous condition of
servitude, if it be true-which I do not admit-that such legislation
would be an interference by government with the social rights of
the people.-"
The Civil Rigkts Cases are definitive in their limitation of the stric-
tures of the Fourteenth Amendment to state activity. But they are signifi-
cant also in their involvement of other sections of the Fourteenth Amend-
25. Supra xiote 13, at 55.
26. Id. at 55-56.
27. See Lombard v. Louisana, iupra note 7 at 274.
28. Civil Rights .Cases, srpra note 13, at 58-59.
29. Id. at 61. It is well settled that Congress, pursuant to the comm.er.ce
power, can prohibit racial discrimination in interstate ,transportation. Seo -Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
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ment and of the Thirteenth Amendment as wellY0 The various aspects of
the case should be kept in mind as we discuss the later applications of the
principles involved.31
The primary impact of the Civil Rights Cases arises from the holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not limit individual or private action,
but instead limits only the actions of a state. In fact, however, the de-
cision on that point was not a pioneering one, in that it expressly rested
upon several prior cases which first enunciated the limited applicability of
the amendment.3 2 In Virginia v. Rives, for example, the Court declared
in a dictum to which Mr. Justice Harlan then made no objection:
The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
we have quoted all have reference to State action exclusively, and
not to any action of private individuals. It is the State which is
prohibited from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws, and consequently the statutes par-
tially enumerating what civil rights colored men shall enjoy equally
with white persons, founded as they are upon the amendment,
are intended for protection against State infringement of those
rights.33
Nevertheless, it is still disputed as to whether this restrictive inter-
pretation comports with the intention of the framers. On the one hand, the
withdrawal from the amendment's purview of discrimination by private
persons has been strongly criticized as "totally foreign to the conceptions
of those who passed the Amendment." 4 And some support for that reproach
can be found in the Congressional debates on the amendment and the en-
forcement acts. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, for example,
asserted in 1871:
Show me, therefore, a legal institution, anything created or reg-
ulated by law, and I show you what must be opened equally to
all without distinction of color. (Emphasis added) 3 5
The Ku Klux Act of 1871, enacted at President Grant's insistence to
30. See, for example, the limited application of the "privileges or immunities"
clause of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment in Slaughter-House Cases, supra
note 24; see also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
31. See Watt and Orlikoff, The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan,
44 ILL. L. REv. 13 (1949).
32. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883); Ex parte Virginia,
supra note 24; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank,
supra note 30.
33. Virginia v. Rives, supra note 32, at 318.
34. Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of
the Law," 50 COLUM. L. Rzv. 131, 162-163 (1950).
35. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871).
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curb the violent excesses of the Klan, provided that failure of a state to
enforce the laws in the teeth of Klan lawlessness "shall be deemed a denial
by such State of the equal protection of the laws. '36 The act went on to
provide for federal criminal punishment of any persons engaged in a con-
spiracy "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted author-
ities of any state from giving or securing to all persons within such state
the equal protections of the laws .... ,37 This would appear to be an expres-
sion of Congressional understanding that some individual discriminatory
action can be reached by federal legislation based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment, at least where the state concerned has been remiss in enforc-
ing its laws against the individual disturbers of the peace. Some caution
is in order, however. Manifestly, the Ku Klux Act was primarily directed
against violent or other outrageous conduct of a magnitude sufficient to
challenge the very order of the state and implicate in such conduct the
state authorities who tolerate it,3s and it is not tenable to claim that it nec-
essarily stands as a Congressional determination that all discrimination
practiced peacefully by a private owner of a public accommodation may
be prohibited pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the Ku
Klux Act has been severely castigated by the Supreme Court for its radical
potential:
The Act, popularly known as the Ku Klux Act, was passed by
a partisan vote in a highly inflamed atmosphere. It was preceded
by spirited debate which pointed out its grave character and sus-
ceptibility to abuse, and its defects were soon realized when its
execution brought about a severe reaction. 9
Against these indications of Congressional intent to reach individual
action by Congressional legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
must be considered the plain meaning of the words of its first section, "No
State shall make or enforce any law... ; nor shall any State depive ... "
(Emphasis added). Considerable support for the literal interpretation of
those words so as to require some sort of state action can be mustered in
the Congressional debates leading to the adoption of the amendment. For
example, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, in introducing the amend-
36. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
37. Ibid.
38. See Frank and Munro, supra note 34, at 164.
39. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951); see also Sharp v. Lucky,
252 F.2d 910, 920 (5th Cir. 1958); BowERs, THE TRGic ERA 340-348 (1929). The
Ku Klux Act was repealed in 1894. 28 Stat. 37 (1894).
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ment on behalf of the Reconstruction Committee, referred to the provisions
of the Constitution, especially the Fifth Amendment:
They do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or pro-
hibition upon state legislation. States are not affected by them, and
it has been repeatedly held that the restriction contained in the
Constitution against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation is not a restriction upon state legis-
lation, but applies only to the legislation of Congress. There is no
power given in the Constitution to enforce and to carry out any
of these guarantees .... They stand simply as a bill of rights in
the Constitution, without power on the part of Congress to give
them full effect; while at the same time the States are not restrained
from violating the principles embraced in them except by their
own local constitutions which may be altered from year to year.
The great object of the first section of this Amendment is, there-
fore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all
times to respect these great fundamental guarantees. . . . Section
one is a restriction upon the States, and does not, of itself, confer
any power upon Congress .... I look upon the first section, taken
in connection with the fifth, as very important. It will, if adopted
by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws
trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which per-
tain to the citizens of the United States, and to all persons who
may happen to be within their jurisdiction.40
In the House of Representatives, Thaddeus Stevens, in presenting
the amendment, stated:
But the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is
not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect,
and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States,
so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate
equally upon all. 41
It is not the purpose here to plumb the subjective intention of the
framers.42 It does seem, however, that the emphatic, near-contemporary
judicial agreement on the point, and the plain meaning of the words of
the amendment, render more probable the conclusion that it is properly
construed to interdict state actions and not the actions of individuals in
which the state is not implicated. Later in this article we shall discuss
the treatment of peripheral state activities as state action, and of individuals
40. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess. part 3, pp. 2764-66.
41. Id. at 2459.
42. See generally FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,




as agents of the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also
we shall examine the possible treatment of state inaction as sufficient state
action to bring the strictures of the amendment into operation. But let
it merely be asserted at this point that some sort of state action does seem
properly required to activate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.43 It has been persuasively asserted that the state action concept
is unworkable and ought to be shelved in favor of a balancing of competing
interests, for example, a balancing of "the personal right to discriminate
as against the public's concern for the elimination of discrimination." 4
It is said that in every conceivable case of racial discrimination there is
some state action or inaction, as when the private homeowner employs
his state-established title to his land to employ racial discrimination in
his selection of social guests.4 5 Therefore, an application of the state action
standard would inevitably result in an application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to all forms of private as well as public discrimination-an
obviously dangerous result.46
An abandonment of the state action standard, however, would be
undesirable on at least two counts. For one thing, it would involve a
repudiation of a construction of the amendment which is at least arguable
and which has the sanction of a long and general acceptance. Also, the
conjured difficulty in construing state action to avoid a relentlessly all-em-
bracing application of the amendment to private discrimination betokens
an unwarranted reluctance to exercise, in construing state action, the same
balancing technique which it is now proposed to employ in a more nebulous
evaluation of a variety of competing interests.47 There appears to be no
compelling necessity for applying an absolutist, unyielding construction
to the state action standard. Rather, it should be recognized that state
action, as that term is used in relation to the amendment, does not em-
brace everything which can, even by the most tenuously abstract logic,
be found to have some connection with the state. Some types of state
action should be construed to bring into effect the prohibition of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and some should not. This ought not to be an impos-
43. State action of some kind also appears to be needed for enforcement of
the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to vote; see James v. Bowman,
190 U.S. 127, 136 (1903); but see Frank and Munro, supra note 34 at 163.
44. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347, 380 (1963).
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sible distinction to make, given a reasonable deference to the historical
development of the subject, and a generous employment of common sense.
It is one thing, though, to affirm that some element of state action is
requisite to an application of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
state action norm therefore ought not to be discarded, but it is another
and more difficult task to define the limits of the norm. 48 The early applica-
tions of the concept were restrictive, in requiring a fairly measurable en-
gagement of state or local government officials before the state would be
considered in action. 9 Routinely, the Supreme Court reiterated the inap-
plicability of the amendment to merely private action.50 Gradually, though,
the concept of state action was expanded by the Court in two directions.
On the one hand, more peripheral types of state activity were brought
within the definition. On the other, more types of persons became susceptible,
owing to their status or activity, to treatment as agents of the state.
Shelley v. Kraemer51 was the celebrated case which widened the circle
of state action to include the enforcement by a state court of a restrictive
covenant barring the sale of real property to Negroes. The Court had long
held that state or city enactments directly prohibiting interracial sales of
land were violative of either the due process or equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 But in Shelley the Court was faced, not
with a clearly invalid official edict of segregation, but with a mutual
covenant among the owners of thirty parcels of realty, that none of such
property would be occupied "by people of the Negro or Mongolian Race" 3
for fifty years. When one owner sold his property to Negroes, owners of
other parcels covered by the agreement sued in the state courts of Missouri
to restrain the Negroes from taking title. The Supreme Court of Missouri
granted the injunction against the sale, but the Supreme Court of the
United States, reversed, holding that the state court's participation was suf-
48. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961),
where the Court said that "to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition
of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task'
which 'This Court has never attempted.' Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs., 330 U.S. 552, 556. .. ."
49. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907) (state executive officers); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (legislative action in enactment of statute
barring Negroes from jury duty); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (state
court judge excluded a Negro from jury duty, contrary to Act of Congress).
50. See, for example, Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926); Hodges
v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906).
51. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
52. Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917).
53. .Supra note 51, at 5.
19641
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ficient state action to make operative the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Restrictive covenants as such are not unconstitutional, since
they are merely private matters, but, under the Shelley rule, they cannot
be enforced in the courts.5 4 In Barrows v. Jackson,5 similar restrictive
covenants were involved and some property owners had violated them by
selling to Negroes. The Court held that state courts could not entertain
damage suits against these sellers by owners of other property subject to
the covenant. Where Shelley found sufficient state action in the granting of
an injunction, Barrows found it in the granting of damages56
Chief Justice Vinson, who wrote the Court's opinion in Shelley, dissented
in Barrows and drew a distinction between the two:
But even if the merits are to be reached .... I think that the
absence of any direct injury to any identifiable non-Caucasian is
decisive. The Shelley case, resting on the express determination that
restrictive covenants are valid between the parties, dealt only
with a state court's attempt to enforce them directly against inno-
cent third parties whose right to enjoy their property would suffer
immediate harm.
In this case, the plaintiffs have not sought such relief. . ..
The majority speaks of this as an attempt to "coerce" re-
spondent to continue to abide by her agreement. Yet the contract
has already been breached. The non-Caucasians are in undisturbed
occupancy. Furthermore, the respondent consented to the "co-
ercion"-if "coercion" there be-by entering into the covenant.
Plaintiffs ask only that respondent now pay what she legally ob-
ligated herself to pay for an injury which she recognized would
occur if she did what she did.
Of course, there may be other elements of coercion. Coercion
might result on the minds of some Caucasian property owners who
have signed a covenant such as this, for they may now feel an
economic compulsion to abide by their agreements. But visiting
coercion upon the minds of some unidentified Caucasian property
owners is not at all the state action which was condemned in the
Shelley case. In that case, the state court had directed "the full
coercive power of government" against the Negro petitioners-
forcefully removing them from their property because they fell in
54. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), decided on the same day as
Shelley, and holding that similar restrictive covenants are unenforceable in the
District of Columbia, pursuant to the fifth amendment which binds the federal
government.
55. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
56. See, generally, Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
[Vol. 29
SIT-INS: PROCEED WITH CAUTION
a class discriminatorily defined. But in this case, where no identifi-
able third person can be directly injured if respondent is made to
disgorge enough to indemnify petitioners, the Court should not
undertake to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment stands as a bar
to the state court's enforcement of its contract law.5"
Whether or not the Barrows ruling was required by the rationale of
Shelley, both are particularly relevant to the question whether a state
court's enforcement of a neutral trespass or breach of the peace statute
against a person ordered to leave a privately-owned public accommodation
by its owner, acting from racial prejudice, is sufficient state action to
bring the Fourteenth Amendment into play. There are obvious distinc-
tions, however, between the racial covenant and simple trespass or breach
of the peace cases. In Shelley, the state court acted to deprive a Negro of
the contractual rights he had gained under a contract freely entered into
by him and his willing vendor, whereas the very purpose of a sit-in is to
compel an unwilling proprietor to contract with the person sitting-in. An
enforcement of the neutral trespass or breach of the peace statute would
not deprive defendant of any contractual rights, unless there is a right
to compel a contract in that situation. In Barrows, while Chief Justice
Vinson was correct in saying that no direct deprivation of contractual
rights was worked against the Negro himself, nevertheless the obnoxious
racial discrimination pervaded the entire covenant and the state was
enforcing a contract which, in 1963, is repugnant in its very terms to
considered public policy, and the enforcement of which would inhibit
prospective vendors from selling their property in violation of such
covenants. The trespass and breach of the peace statutes, however, are
neutral and untainted by -discrimination in their terms. The discrimination
involved is a matter of the motive for employing the statute. To deny
the enforcement of a valid trespass or breach of the peace statute in a
case where it has been formally and materially violated, merely because
of an unhealthy motive of the complainant, could lead to unpredictability
in the law.5s Furthermore, if we assume that the proprietor is acting from
uncoerced free will, he does not wish to contract with the rejected customer.
A refusal to enforce the trespass statute would come perilously close to a
holding that there is a right to compel an unwilling party to enter a con-
tract, a rule which would be quite unexampled apart from those public-
57. Supra note 55, at 267-268.
58. Of course, a particular statute may be impermissibly vague and there-
fore unenforceable. That is a possibility which must be considered in any spe-
cific case, but a discussion of it is beyond the purview of this treatment.
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service callings which impose, by common law or statute, an obligation
to serve. Moreover, if the state action in the sit-in case is found only in
the state court's enforcement of the trespass or breach of the peace statute,
the result could indicate, as did Shelley and Barrows, that there may be a
right to refuse service on racial grounds but that it simply is unenforceable
in the courts. This could lead to an assertion that the proprietor who has
the right to refuse service has an incidental right to remove the would-be
customer from the premises so long as unreasonable force is not used. 9 And
if the aid of the police and courts is not available, there may be an unwhole-
some encouragement of self-help. In short, if state action is to be found
in the sit-in situation, it would seem preferable to avoid finding it in the
enforcement of a trespass or breach of the peace statute, and to seek it
instead in independent actions of state officials or in an enlarged semi-public
status of the proprietor himself.
It is fair to say that Shelley and Barrows betokened an elastic trend in
the treatment of state action which may be difficult to control. The most
recent example is Lombard v. Louirianua,'° where the Court found that,
even without a statute or ordinance commanding segregation in New Orleans
restaurants, sufficient state involvement in the proprietor's discrimination
was found in the statements of the Mayor and the Superintendent of Police
discouraging sit-in demonstrations-statements, incidentally, that were
at least nominally directed toward the preservation of public peace and
order and not toward the maintenance of segregation as such.
The related movement to bring more classes of persons within the
ambit of state action has taken varied form. In effect it involves a treatment
of the individual as an agent of the state for this limited purpose. The
notion, however, is not a novel one. It is found, for example, in the dissent-
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases:
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of
inns, and managers of places of public amusement are agents or in-
strumentalities of the State, because they are charged with duties
to the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties and func-
tions, to governmental regulation."1
The nexus between the state and its supposed agent can be found in
several ways. It can be financial, through public subsidy of the erstwhile
59. See Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913).
60. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
61. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 58-59 (1883).
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private person or body.62 Or the state can devolve public functions upon
the formerly private entity, as in the election cases where political parties
were held to perform a public function in the selection of candidates in
primary elections, who were recognized by the state through their inclusion
on the general election ballot 0 3 Or a state formulation of a discriminatory
policy, which is imposed upon or accepted by a private party, may cause
the action of that private person to be considered the action of the state.6 4
Whatever the rationale in any particular case, there is an apparent trend
to treat ever broader categories of persons as agents of a state with which
they may in fact have less than a substantial connection. Obviously, this
tendency can be carried to extremes. It is difficult to conceive of any human
activity that is not in some way supported, regulated, or at least legitimized
by the state. The private homeowner, even if he has no government-insured
mortgage, is a "homeowner" by virtue of state laws recognizing that status.
When he decides to invite social guests to his home, and does so on a
discriminatory basis, there is, through state sanction of his title, a tenuous
and theoretical state participation in his discrimination. Certainly, subjection
of such a homeowner to the Fourteenth Amendment rules applicable to
the state, would obliterate any meaningful distinction between the public
and the private spheres. Even Mr. Justice Douglas, who believes that any
"place of public accommodation under license from the State"' is thereby
an instrumentality of the State, draws the line at the door of the private
home:
62. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (lessee of
state-owned property held bound by the fourteenth amendment in conduct of res-
taurant on that property).
63. Rice v. Elmore, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); and see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953) (The "private" Jaybird Democratic Association of Fort Bend County,
Texas, regarded all white voters in the county as members and excluded Negroes
from its "primary" election, which it held prior to the official primary to select
candidates it would endorse in that official primary and in the general election.
The Supreme Court struck down this device as a subterfuge, with Mr. Justice
Minton dissenting.); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
64. See discussion in Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956);
Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, 554 (1949);
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960). See also
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 911 (1962), holding that where a city sold its golf courses to private pur-
chasers with a reversionary clause providing that the land be used only as golf
courses or revert to the city, the new owners were enjoined from restricting the
use of the courses to white patrons. The reversionary clause made the purchasers
state agents since it reposed sufficient "present control and interest" in the city. The
case is well noted in 9 WAYNE L. REv. 373 (1963).
65. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281 (1963) (concurring opinion).
19641
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
If this were an intrusion of a man's home or yard or farm or garden,
the property owner could seek and obtain the aid of the State
against the intruder. For the Bill of Rights, as applied to the State
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
casts its weight on the side of the privacy of homes. 68
The proper inquiry in the sit-in cases, then, must be to determine
the point at which participation by the state is sufficient to translate the
proprietor's moral duty to serve without discrimination into a legal imper-
ative mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Also to be considered
here is the federal structure of the American system of government, for
an application of the Fourteenth Amendment involve to a considerable
extent a supersession of individual, state and local responsibility in favor
of an overarching federal power. If the state action concept were pushed
to "a drily logical extreme," all of us would be agents of the state for at
least some purposes, and subject to federal control under the Fourteenth
Amendment, for few areas of human endeavor are uncolored by state sup-
port, license or sufferance.
In deciding what sort of state participation is sufficient to subject the
otherwise private discrimination, for example, of a restaurateur, to Four-
teenth Amendment regulation, due consideration must be given to the
right to own and use private property and to the property owner's liberty
to direct that use as he sees fit. The Fourteenth Amendment, in section
one, provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." The right of property has long been
regarded as a fundamental and natural right, inherent in the person and
not dependent upon a constitutional or legislative grant for its validity.67
Of course, the problems posed by the sit-ins cannot be resolved by ritualistic
incantations concerning liberty or the general rights of property. There is
a specific issue here, and it is the extent of the right of an owner or pro-
prietor of a public accommodation, whether we call it a property right or
an attribute of his personal liberty, to arbitrarily refuse his services to
some or all persons. Fortunately, the courts have addressed themselves to
this general point. In Terinal Taxicab Co. v. District of Colm.bia, Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered this dictum:
It is true that all business, and for the matter of that, every life in
all its details, has a public aspect, some bearing upon the welfare
66. Id. at 274.
67. See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627 (1829); and see cases collected in
11 AM. JUR. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 335.
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of the community in which it is passed. But however it may have
been in earlier days as to the common callings, it is assumed in our
time that an invitation to the public to buy does not necessarily
entail an obligation to sell. It is assumed that an ordinary shop
keeper may refuse his wares arbitrarily to a customer whom he
dislikes, and although that consideration is not conclusive . . . .
it is assumed that such a calling is not public as the word is used8
There are, of course, some recognized exceptions to the right of a
proprietor of a public accommodation to discriminate against prospective
patrons. Generally, in a business "clothed with a public interest" the
proprietor may be required by statute to forego his right to select his
customers arbitrarily. In 1923, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
Kansas statute declaring the meat packing business to be affected with a
public interest and subjecting such a business to wage and other labor
regulations.69 But the Court then defined the categories of businesses af-
fected with a public interest:
Businesses said to be clothed with a public interest justifying
some public regulation may be divided into three classes:
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a
public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly im-
poses the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded
by any member of the public. Such as railroads, other common car-
riers and public utilities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the public
interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest times, has
survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial
legislatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of
the keepers of inns, cabs and grist mills. ...
(3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may
be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject
in consequence to some government regulation. They have come
to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superim-
posed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner by de-
voting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an
interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to
the extent of that interest although the property continues to
belong to its private owner and to be entitled to protection accord-
ingly. . ..
It is manifest from an examination of the cases cited under
the third head that the mere declaration by a legislature that a
68. 241 U.S. 252, 256 (1916).
69. Wolff v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
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business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the
question whether its attempted regulation on that ground is jus-
tified. The circumstances of its alleged change from the status of
a private business and its freedom from regulation into one in
which the public have come to have an interest are always a subject
of judicial inquiry.
... It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the
Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the
tailor, the wood chopper, the mining operator or the miner was
clothed with such a public interest that the price of his product or
his wages could be fixed by State regulation. It is true that in the
days of the early common law an omnipotent Parliament did reg-
ulate prices and wages as it chose, and occasionally a Colonial
legislature sought to exercise the same power; but nowadays one
does not devote one's property or business to the public use or
clothe it with a public interest merely because one makes commod-
ities for, and sells to, the public in the common callings of which
those above mentioned are instances.
An ordinary producer, manufacturer or shopkeeper may
sell or not sell as he likes ... , and while this feature does not
necessarily exclude businesses from the class clothed with a public
interest ...it usually distinguishes private from quasi-public oc-
cupations.
In nearly all the businesses included under the third head
above, the thing which gave the public interest was the indispens-
able nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrary
control to which the public might be subjected without regulation.
... If, as in effect contended by counsel for the State, the com-
mon callings are clothed with a public interest by a mere legislative
declaration, which necessarily authorizes full and comprehensive
regulation within legislative discretion, there must be a revolution
in the relation of government to general business. This will be
running the public interest argument into the ground, to use a
phrase of Mr. Justice Bradley when characterizing a similarly
extreme contention. Civil Rigkts Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 .... It will
be impossible to reconcile such result with the freedom of contract
and of labor secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."0
An ordinary shopkeeper, not an innkeeper, therefore, is not normally
considered to be engaged in such a business affected with a public interest
that the legislature can impose upon it the extensive sort of regulations to
which an innkeeper may be subjected.71 At least it can be said that the
70. Id. at 535-540.
71. In fact, in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), "the
Court said that a business might be affected with a public interest so as to permit
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ordinary shopkeeper is under no obligation to serve without discrimination,
in the absence of a statute to the contrary. But it is settled that a statute,
enacted pursuant to the police power of the state, can impose upon
"any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement" an obliga-
tion to serve potential customers without regard to "race, creed, color or
national origin." 72 Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia now
forbid racial discrimination in public accommodations of one sort or
another.7 3 It should be noted, though, that the police power of a state
does not depend, for the validity of its exercise, upon any showing that
the individual activity regulated is state action, while, under the existing
precedents, individuals can be regulated by Congress or the federal courts
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment only if state action is presentT
4
Therefore, the proper conclusion that a state possesses power to bar dis-
crimination in public accommodations does not mandate a conclusion that
such discrimination of itself is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
price regulation although no public trust was impressed upon the property and
although the public might not have a legal right to demand and receive service ......
Tyson and Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 434 (1927). This approach would in-
dicate that the restriction upon an unfettered choice of customers is, in a sense,
a greater restriction even than a price regulation.
72. NEW YORK CIVIL RIGiTs LAw § 40. This section is constitutional. People
v. King, 110 N.Y. 418 18 N.E. 245 (1888). Accord, as to a similar California stat-
ute, Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907). In Railway Mail Assn.
v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945), the Supreme Court upheld Section 43 of the NEw
YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAw, which prohibits racial and religious discrimination by
labor unions.
73. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 51-52 (Supp. 1961); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-1
et seq. (1953); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-35 (Supp. 1961); D. C. CODE § 47-
2901 et seq. (Supp. 1960); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 18-7301 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, §8 125-128 (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901, 10-902 (Supp.
1962); IOWA CODE ANN. § 735.1 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2424 (1949);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 50 (Supp. 1959); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 11-
15 (Acts 1963, c. 227, c. 228); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1956);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (Supp. 1959); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1947);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-211 (Supp. 1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-101.102(1943); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354.1 (Supp. 1961); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-2
to 10:1-7 (1960); N. M. STAT. ANN. §8 49-8-1 to 49-8-6 (Supp. 1961); N. Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (1948); N. Y. EXECUTIVE LAW H8 292 (9), 296 (2) (Supp.
1962); N. D. REV. CODE § 12-22-30 (Supp. 1961); Oio REV. CODE § 4112.02 (G)
(Anderson Supp. 1961); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.670-680, as amended by L. 1961
c. 247; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654, as amended by Act No. 19 (1961); R. I.
GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-6 (1956); S. D. ACTs 1963, Senate Bill No. 1,
Jan. 30, 1963; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 88 1451, 1452 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE§H 49.60.040, 49.60.215 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 924.04 (1958), as amended
(Supp. 1962); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-83.2 (Supp. 1961).
74. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); for a discussion of the residual
character of the state police power, see Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, supra note
72, at 363; Munn. v. Illinois, 99 U.S. 113 (1876).
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Rather the discrimination, to be proscribed by that amendment, must pass
the prior test of state action.15
Federal legislation or direct judicial action, of course, could invalidate
all racial discrimination in public accommodations through an outrght re-
jection of the state action requirement. This, as we have discussed already,
is hardly a desirable technique. It is far more likely that the invalidation,
if done under the Fourteenth Amendment,7 6 will be effected through a broad-
ening of the state action classification which, while retained, would be
stretched to include the privately-owned public accommodation not "clothed
with a public interest," even in a community without a statute, ordinance
or public policy favoring segregation.7 7 In determining whether, as a matter
of constitutional policy, the state action test should be extended so far, the
proprietor's liberty and right of property have a direct bearing.
Restaurants and other public accommodations are usually licensed by
the state or local government concerned, and regulations can accompany
the licensing requirement. The license, however, is regularly held not to
convert the otherwise private business into a public one.75 Such license
requirements are generally designed to protect the health and safety of
the community and do not authorize local officials "to control the manage-
ment of the business of a restaurant or to dictate what persons will be
served.170 Of course, if the licensed business is an inn, there will be an
independent obligation to serve without discrimination, but this arises from
75. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 74. See Karst and Van Alstyne, Comment:
Sit-Ins and State Action, 14 STAN L. REv. 762, 773 (1962), arguing against the
conversion of the fourteenth amendment "into a self-executing omnibus fair em-
ployment and civil rights act, covering all forms of racial discrimination which
could be reached by state legislative power." (Emphasis in original.) The authors
warn that such a construction "can also be used inversely, to cut back the state's
power so that its civil rights legislation is justified only to the extent that it
reaches governmental action." See O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Dis-
crimination, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 664, 682 (WASH. Super. Ct. 1959); the case was
affirmed without passing on this point, 365 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 839 (1962).
76. See main text, infra, for a discussion of the possible application of the
commerce clause as a justification for such anti-discrimination legislation.
77. The application of the thirteenth amendment here, as suggested by Mr.
Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, supra note 74, is far less
tenable or likely. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
78. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697(1947).
79. Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181 F.Supp. 124, (D. C. Md.
1960), aff'd. per curiam, 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir., 1960); Eaton v. Grubbs, 216
F.Supp. 465 (E.D. N.C. 1963).
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the common law obligation of an innkeeper, 0 and does not support an
inference that the operation of the inn is thereby state action.sl
Although the general public have an implied license to enter any
public accommodation such as a restaurant or retail store, that license has
regularly been held at common law to be revocable at the will of the
proprietor. 2 The right of a proprietor of a licensed private business, not
"clothed with a public interest" as that term is commonly understood, to
select his customers on the basis of race or any other arbitrary criterion,
where no statute, ordinance or public policy dictates otherwise, is so far
settled.8 3 But the fact that this common law right has been heretofore
conceded does not insulate it from attack. If experience and reason now
demonstrate clearly that the untrammeled recognition of this right no
longer comports with overriding considerations of constitutional policy, the
Supreme Court has power, under existing precedents, to alter the rule.
In a matter of sufficiently serious import, accepted canons of stare decisis
will not prevent a reversal of the existent rule.s  A vindication of the pro-
prietor's rights in the sit-in cases cannot be had, then, by a simple mar-
shalling of precedent, although precedents are surely not lightly to be
discarded. Unless some unacceptable disadvantage can be shown to be
likely to result from a disregard of the proprietor's alleged rights, then we
can expect that those rights will give way to the asserted and appealing
right to racial equality in all public accommodations.
The chief argument for the existing recognition of the proprietor's
rights may be the one raised by Mr. Justice Bradley for the Court in the
Civil Riglkts Cases: "If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the pro-
80. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra note 78.
81. See Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766, 56 Am. Rep. 355 (1885),
where the court indicated that a place of public amusement, if licensed by .the
state, would thereby become subject to all the obligations attendant upon an inn-
keeper, including that of refraining from an arbitrary denial of service.
82. Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100 So. 240 (1924);
Crouch v. Ringer, 110 Wash. 612, 188 Pac. 782 (1920); see Annots., 33 A.L.R.
421 (1924), 9 A.L.R. 379 (1920), and cases there compiled.
83. See, for example, Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d
845 (4th Cir. 1959); Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, supra note 78;
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773, 776 (1944).
84. See the discussion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405411 (1932), arguing that reversal is
more readily justified "where the question presented is one of applying as distin-
guished from what may accurately be called interpreting, the Constitution." (285
U.S. at 410); for a contrasting opinion, see Long, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis:
Misapplied to Constitutional Law, 45 A.B.A.J. 921 (1959), arguing that the flex-




hibitions of the Amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop."8' 5
If an individual customer can compel an unwilling proprietor of a public
accommodation to contract with him simply because the business is li-
censed or serves the public, where the business is not clothed with a com-
mon law public interest and where no statute or ordinance requires equal-
ity of service, it is difficult to see where the line can be finally drawn.
Many types of business, other than food preparation and sale, are reg-
ulated or required by law to be licensed in order to serve the public. For
example, attorneys,88 barbers,8 7 beauty parlors,8 blood banks,8 9 boarding
houses, 0 chiropractors,9' private clubs selling alcoholic beverages, 92 den-
tists,13 electricians,"' dmbalmers and undertakers, 5 employment agencies, 96
firearms dealers, 7 hairdressers and cosmetologists,98 insurance agents,0 0
insurance brokers, 0 certain clergymen, such as a minister of a Spiritualist
church,' 0' optometrists,102 osteopaths, 03 pawnbrokers, 0 4 peddlers and hawk-
ers,10 5 personal loan companies, 1 6 pharmacists, 0 7 physicians and surgeons, 0 8
physiotherapists,L°  plumbers,"10 podiatrists,"' pool and billiard rooms,1 2
practical nurses,"1 3 private detectives and investigators,1 4 private insane
85. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 74.
86. NEW YORK JUDICIARY LAW § 460.
87. NEw YORK GENERAL BusINEsS LAW §§ 432, 439.
88. Id. § 446.
89. NEW YORK PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 3120-22.
90. NEW YORK PUBLIC HEALTH SANITARY CODE, Ch. 7A.
91. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW § 6553.
92. NEW YORK ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL LAW § 66.
93. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §§ 6605, 6608-10, 6612-14.
94. NEW YoRK GENERAL Cnly LAW § 20.
95. NEW YoRK PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 3421.
96. NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 174.
97. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 1914.
98. NEW YoRK EDUCATION LAW § 404.
99. NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW §§ 113, 114.
100. Id. §§ 118, 119, 124.
101. NEW YORK RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS LAW §§ 210, 211.
102. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §§ 211, 7103, 7105-08, 7111.
103. See NEw YORK EDUCATION LAW § 6512.
104. See NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 1590.
105. NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW §§ 30, 31.
106. NEW YORK BANKING LAW § 362.
107. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §§ 211, 6803, 6804.
108. Id. § 6502, 6506-6511, 6513, 6514.
109. Id. §§ 6502, 6512, 6514.
110. Supra note 94, § 56.
111. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW §§ 7003, 7006.
112. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 345.
113. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW § 6906.
114. NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 70.
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asylums, 115 private institutions for the treatment of mental disorders or
epileptics,-16 registered nurses, 1 7 surveyors,"x8 and veterinarians"' are
among the businesses and professions specifically licensed or regulated by
law in New York. Other states have similar patterns. 20 If licensing and the
offering of service to the public make a restaurant a public instrumentality
so as to convert its action into state action, it is difficult to see why
the same could not be true in every licensed or regulated business or
profession dealing in some way with the public. While racial discrimination
is as invidious in the callings enumerated here as it is in a hot dog stand,
and while the states, employing police power, probably could prohibit
racial discrimination in most or all of them,121 it could be a dubious tech-
nique to bring the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment directly to
bear upon them. In the attempt to resolve the problem of racial discrim-
ination, there ought to be a proper deference to the concept of federalism.
If the factors that make a hot dog stand an instrumentality of the state
are service to the public and the license or regulation requirement, then
all licensed or regulated businesses or professions that serve the public
are equally arms of the state. Such a construction would stretch the state
action standard beyond recognition while ostensibly retaining it. And if
the controlling factor in the finding of state action is the issuance of a
license, we are led to ponder the status of the licensed individual driver
of a motor vehicle.
But if the reductio ad absurdum is inappropriate, and even if the
occupations mentioned above would not be swept into the Fourteenth
Amendment vortex by the extension of that amendment to the restaurant,
there is cause for concern about that first step alone. Suppose an injunction
to serve Negro patrons is issued against a restaurant and the proprietor
thereby loses the trade of a dozen white customers. This could happen,
especially in a community where the injunction against the one proprietor
broke an existing uniform pattern of segregation. The prospect of losing
such trade could well have influenced the proprietor not to integrate. Also,
it could be unfair to subject him alone among the restaurant proprietors
115. NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 1122.
116. NEw YORK MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 202.
117. NEW YORK EDUCATION LAW § 6907.
118. Id. §§ 7202, 7205-7207, 7210, 7211.
119. Id. §§ 6702, 6704, 6706-6709, 6711, 6712.
120. See, for example, CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE, passim.
121. See Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
1964]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in a town to economic loss as the price of his integration.122 It seems plain
that the dozen white customers are lending significant, if not essential,
support to the maintenance of segregation in that public accommodation.
In order, then, to achieve integration equitably in the enjoined restaurant,
it could be practically necessary to enjoin the customers from taking their
business elsewhere, or at least from doing so in concert. This may well be
an undesirable infringement upon the freedom of choice of those customers,
regardless of the moral delinquency of their refusal to patronize the
integrated facility, especially in that violations of the injunction could be
triable without a jury as contempts. If the alternative is said to be a
prompt extension of the injunction to all restaurants in the community,
the problem is not entirely avoided, but is merely met on a broader scale,
since it is not difficult to conceive of a total diminution of restaurant pa-
tronage in a community with newly-integrated restaurants. It may be
said that this speculation is too conjectural, that similar conjectures could
be made concerning most penal statutes, and that the elimination of seg-
regation in public accommodations ought not to be stayed merely because
of some chimerical prospect that such a newly-conceded judicial or legisla-
tive power will be pushed to an extremity of doubtful worth. However,
in evaluating a proposed course of decision, it is quite relevant to foresee
its natural and proximate extensions. The extension of the judicial mandate
to customers could well be necessary or warranted at or near the outset
of a judicial program desegregating public accommodations in general.
Moreover, if the courts can impose what amounts in effect to a duty to
sell upon the proprietor, it is not captious or unreasonable to conclude
that they may, with almost equal facility, impose upon a boycotting cus-
tomer a duty to buy. If it is said that this has presented no significant
problem in the enforcement of existing state equal accommodations statutes,
it ought to be recalled that those statutes were not enacted in the teeth
of popular resistance such as, lamentably but undeniably, exists in some
states today.
If a store owner decided to go out of business, admitting that this
decision was prompted largely by personal animadversion toward serving
Negroes, could he be enjoined under the proposed new standards from
doing so, especially if his were the only store of its kind in the com-
122. "The ad hoc nature of judicial desegregation thus tends to make the first
target of a sit-in demonstration the economic fall guy for the community." Karst
and Van Alstyne, supra note 75 at 770.
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munity? It is worthwhile to recall here that the National Labor Relations
Board recently restrained a manufacturing corporation from closing its
plant and going out of business where the corporation's decision was
motivated in part by aversion to the employees' union activities.123 A
strained construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, extending the imme-
diate reach of federal power to public accommodations in general, might
well be productive of greater mischief than relief. Moreover, a stultification
of the federal government through an ineffective enforcement could be
worse than no federal participation at all. If the Fourteenth Amendment
is to be employed, it will have to be used in a thorough and perhaps
relentless manner. In the conduct of such a quest for equality, the com-
peting value of liberty could suffer seriously, and this not alone in the
infringment upon asserted property rights of proprietors, but in a general
undue encroachment upon that voluntarism which, while not immune to
some restriction and qualification, is still the hallmark of a free society.
The difficulties attendant upon an extension of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the ordinary public accommodation would not be avoided by
a reliance upon some element other than the licensing of the accommoda-
tion or the active participation of state officials as the touchstone for a
finding of state action. For example, under some circumstances, state
action may properly be found in state inaction, in that a state's failure
to take affirmative steps to eliminate segregation in some situations may
in itself constitute a denial of equal protection.124 On the other hand,
it cannot be said that a state is under a positive duty to eliminate all
forms of unofficial segregation in a community.125 But whether or not the
state is held to an affirmative duty to end segregation in public accommoda-
tions, and thereby its failure to do so is considered action, the same prob-
lems of limitations are met. If the potentiality of over-extension of the
desegregation mandate, so as to impinge unduly upon other rights and
interests, is present when the state action is found through a licensing
123. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 NLRB No. 23 (1962).
124. The three Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871 seem to have rested upon
this theory; Frank and Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. Rav. 131, 163 et seq. (1950). See also Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725(1961); Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1951); Catlette v.
United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943).
125. See, for example, Bell v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 213 F.Supp. 819(N.D. Ind. 1963), holding that a Board of Education is not under an affirmative




of the accommodation, it is present as well when the state action is found
in state inaction. The resort, therefore, to the formula of state inaction
will not eliminate the problem of drawing the line. Indeed, the state
inaction formula would seem to be as vulnerable on that score as the
licensing criterion.126
Furthermore, the difficulties of limitation are analytically present when
the prohibition of segregation is attempted by federal legislation based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment as well as when the prohibition is applied
by direct judicial interpretation of the amendment without federal en-
forcing legislation. For example, the proposed Interstate Public Accom-
modations Act of 1963127 provides for injunctive relief, at the suit of "the
person aggrieved," or of the Attorney General upon complaint by a
person aggrieved, 1 21 against any person who, "whether acting under color
of law or otherwise' '12 shall:
(a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny, or deprive
or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege secured
by section 3, or (b) interfere or attempt to interfere with any
right or privilege secured by section 3, or (c) intimidate, threaten,
or coerce any person with a purpose of interfering with any right
or privilege secured by section 3, or (d) punish or attempt to
punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any
right or privilege secured by section 3, or (e) incite or aid or abet
any person to do any of the foregoing. 30
Such a provision could warrant, in an appropriate situation, an in-
junction against customers, and perhaps others, who induce a proprietor
to maintain segregation by their announced intention not to patronize
the accommodation in the event it is integrated. Nor is the problem of
possible over-extension of injunctive compulsion avoided by basing a
126. Significantly, the proposed Interstate Public Accommodations Act of 1963
(S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.) resorts in part to the state inaction theory in sec-
tion 2(h): "The discriminatory practices described above are in all cases en-
couraged, fostered or tolerated in some degree by the governmental authorities
of the States in which they occur, which license or protect the businesses involved
by means of laws and ordinances and the activities of their executive and judicial
officers. Such discriminatory practices, particularly when their cumulative effect
throughout the Nation is considered, take on the character of action by the States
and therefore fall within the ambit of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States." (Emphasis added). The
same provision is found in Title II of the omnibus Civil Rights Bill of 1963. (S.
1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.).
127. S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
128. Id. § 5(a).
129. Id. § 4.
130. Ibid.
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public accommodations statute upon the commerce clause."31 Indeed, it
may be accentuated thereby. If the proprietor of a restaurant which serves
food transported in interstate commerce imposes, by refusing service to
a Negro, a burden upon that commerce significant enough to warrant con-
gressional prohibition, can it be said that the refusal of a dozen of his
customers to continue their patronage of the integrated facility imposes
no significant burden upon that commerce?13
Federal legislation to bar segregation in public accommodations, how-
ever, whether enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment or the
commerce clause, does offer the advantage that it would lessen the likelihood
that one proprietor would become the "fall guy" in the community.
Judicial desegregation decrees are necessarily ad hoc, while a statute
which has strong civil or criminal sanctions could effect wide-spread
desegregation more promptly through its actual enforcement or the de-
terrent effect of its potential sanctions. 13 3 But even where the desegregation
mandate is statutory, the problem of popular rejection may be met on a
broader scale. If the Congressional power to legislate in the area be con-
ceded, it could require for its implementation an imposition of civil or
criminal sanctions against an unofficial popular boycott of newly-integrated
accommodations. The problem, then, of ancillary enforcement directed
against individual customers is troublesome whether the desegregation is
by judicial decree or legislation, and whether the recalcitrant customers
are few or many. Surely, the line ought to be drawn short of telling in-
dividual citizens where they must eat, but locating it with precision and
fairness before that point may be a task incapable of practical achieve-
ment.
It would be erroneous, though, to infer that the problem of ancillary
enforcement is the central objection to extending the reach of federal
131. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963, supra note 126, and the pro-
posed Interstate Public Accommodations Act of 1963, supra note 126, are based
partly upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and partly
upon the commerce clause of the United States Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).
132. The rule of de minimis non curat lex has been held not to limit consti-
tutionally the reach of other federal statutes regulatory of commerce, such as the
Fair Labor Standards Act. See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co. 327 U.S. 178
(1946); but see McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943), holding that an em-
ployee engaged in serving meals to maintenance-of-way employees of an interstate
railroad pursuant to a contract between his employer and the railroad is not "en-
gaged in commerce."
133. See the discussion in Karst and Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State
Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762, 770 (1962).
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power, under the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause, 84 to
public accommodations in general. That problem is merely used herein
to illustrate the general diminution of voluntarism which is likely to attend
the general incursion of federal enforcement. Nor does opposition to the
extension spring from a solicitude for the racially-biased discriminators.
It is, of course, difficult to work up any sympathy for either the proprietor
or the customer who would withdraw an otherwise public invitation to
buy because of the color of a person, otherwise included, who seeks to
accept that invitation. But the questions posed by the suggested expansion
of federal power cut more deeply than that. For one thing, there is the
extra-constitutional consideration that racial discrimination is a problem
of diverse elements, including moral, economic, social and political ones.
And while the full force of law, in its proper channels, ought to be applied
to the eradication of such discrimination as is amenable to a coercive
remedy, nevertheless the engines of legal compulsion do have their limita-
tions. While the issue is debatable, it would seem fair to conclude that
a direction of federal compulsive power into the general public accommoda-
tions field, where it would be difficult to channel toward finite and prac-
tical objectives, entails an unacceptable risk of ironically impeding the
establishment of that voluntary cooperation without which any short range
achievements would be pyrrhic. The attack upon discrimination in public
accommodations must be maintained, but it ought not to be allowed
to become a total, and perhaps destructive, assault upon a mere symptom.
The suggestions that a general federal legislative or judicial employ-
ment of compulsion against discrimination in public accommodations might
be misdirected in terms of the long range objective to be pursued, is not
one that can be supported by legal authority, for this is an area of policy
and value judgment which cannot readily be reduced to the rubrics of
precedent. The same can be said of the related notion that such federal
activity would unduly impinge upon that freedom of association and choice
which a free society ought generally to encourage. We are dealing here
mainly with matters of degree and the issues are difficult to frame with
precision. In deciding at what point the asserted right to equal treatment
in public accommodations ought not to be enforced by federal power and
ought to become a matter for private or local solution, the pivotal factor
134. For purposes of discussion here, it is conceded that Congress has consti-
tutional power to enact a public accommodations statute under the present judicial
conceptions of the commerce clause. See Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960);
Mitchell v. U.S., 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
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may well be the likelihood of federal intrusion upon concededly private
and social relations. The major policy objection to a federal entry into the
general public accommodations field, therefore, may best be phrased in
terms, not of a theoretical invasion of a categorically defined right of
property or choice, but rather of a tangible prospect that federal enforce-
ment, once introduced, might not be contained short of an Orwellian intru-
sion into private and social affairs. 13 5
These reservations are not beyond dispute, and it would be less than
useful to criticize the proposed extension of federal power without sug-
gesting an alternative approach that can implement fairly the just
aspirations for equality without injuring the federate and limited structure
of government which is, in the long run, a prerequisite to the fullest
realization of those aspirations. Here the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Lombard v. Louisian&a36 may point the way. Although there was
no statute or ordinance mandating segregation, the Court nevertheless
found state action in public statements of the Mayor and the Superintendent
of Police which, while they were ostensibly directed toward the maintenance
of peace, the Court found to have directed the continuance of segregated
service as such. The Lombard decision carried to its outermost limits to
date the apparent trend to find "state action" in less direct and even
incidental involvements of state or local governmental officials. In prin-
ciple, the approach appears to be correct. A state can act in ways more
subtle than the enactment of a statute or an ordinance. When a state
official throws the prestige of his office onto the scales in an endorsement
of otherwise private segregation, the consequence usually will be a predict-
able reinforcement of the private party's determination to segregate. At
the point where that public official's encouragement becomes a substantial
factor in the proprietor's decision to conduct his restaurant on a segregated
basis, the Fourteenth Amendment should be interposed to bar the discrimina-
tion. In Lombard itself, it appears that the Court applied this legitimate
principle erroneously to the facts. In the trial court, evidence was excluded
as to the extent to which the proprietor was coerced or influenced by the
statements of the Mayor and the Superintendent of Police. As Mr. Justice
Harlan observed in his dissent, the utterances of those officials were, in
his opinion, "more properly read as an effort by these two officials to
135. See Cahn, Juiispudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955), in which the
author, who is unswerving in his opposition to public segregation, affirms in
another context the distinction between official and unofficial segregation.
136. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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preserve the peace in what they might reasonably have regarded as a
highly charged atmosphere"'13  rather than as evasive attempts to en-
courage segregation as such. The case should have been returned to the
trial court for a resolution of this key factual issue.
The principle of Lombard is not really novel. It is clear that a state
cannot escape its burden under the Fourteenth Amendment by cloaking
its action in a fictitious private character. Just as it is violative of the
amendment for a state to abolish its primary election laws, but then en-
courage white "private" primaries by according to the victor a place on
the general election ballot, so it should be equally wrong for a state or
city, having abolished all statutes and ordinances promoting segregation,
to encourage segregation by public pronouncements of government offi-
cials.138 Nor does the relative informality of a state's promotion of segrega-
tion insulate that promotion from Fourteenth Amendment attack.239 The
Lombard approach, however, requires careful limitation. It should not
be carried so far as to bar genuinely private discrimination in areas where
the state has no legitimate interest, such as social discrimination in a home
or private club, merely because that discrimination has been encouraged
by public statements of public officials. The crucial factor in finding a
sufficient state interest ought to be the holding out of the premises as open
to the public. 40 If there are public statements by government officials en-
couraging segregation in such a facility, and if they constitute a substan-
tial factor in the proprietor's decision to segregate, "state action" ought
to be considered present. But even in establishments holding themselves
open to the public, a truly private decision to segregate, not substantially
influenced by official action, ought to be beyond the federal power.' 4 '
137. 373 U.S. at 254.
138, See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Rice v. Elmore 333 U.S. 875
(1948).
139. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan 372 U.S. 58 (1963), holding that a system
of informal censorship of obscene literature, carried on by the Rhode Island Com-
mission to Encourage Morality in Youth, violated the freedom of the press pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment.
140. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), treating a company owned
town as a municipality because of its open character, despite its private ownership.
141. For the reasons indicated supra, mere official enforcement of a neutral
trespass or breach of the peace statute ought not of itself to be sufficient official
action to activate the Lombard rule, even if the presence of such a statute, and
the prospect of its enforcement, is a source of encouragement to racially-biased
proprietors. The inquiry should rather be directed toward official encouragements
of segregation as such. Of course, it is conceivable that official pronouncements
reminding the populace of the presence of trespass or breach of the peace statutes
may in fact be covert devices to encourage segregation as such. State action would
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Even where such a decision is in keeping with a genuinely private local
custom favoring segregation in such establishments, there ought not to
be a finding of state action as long as the custom is not substantially in-
fluenced by any formal or informal sanction on the part of public officials.12
In summary, then, the opposition to the extension of federal super-
vision into the general public accommodations field, is more effectively
rested upon prudential than theoretical grounds. Apart from the question
of bare constitutionality, wisdom would counsel against the adoption of a
rather extreme course where a more moderate one would seem to promise
an equivalent remedy. The limited approach suggested in principle by
Lombard. could be employed to direct the anti-discrimination effort
into a productive channel. The federal attack should be upon governmental
promotion of racial discrimination, rather than directly upon the mis-
guided discriminators. In fact, we can confidently expect that discrimina-
tion in public accommodations will disappear in an acceptably short time
when it is no longer nourished by governmental patronage and encourage-
ment. If, however, the federal offensive is launched directly upon the
private citizens concerned, it could well do violence to settled constitutional
interpretations, and would entail an encroachment upon the heretofore
concededly state and private spheres which ought not to be countenanced
in the absence of a demonstrated necessity therefor. Moreover, an uncritical
resort to compulsion could retard the growing development of a free
popular consensus favoring equality of opportunity.
It is, of course, true that the Lombard approach involves an extension
of federal power beyond its prior bounds. It also carries in its train, in
principle, the same general problems of limitation as are found in the
more extreme suggested approaches. But there is a real difference of degree.
Under the Lombard approach, the general encroachment upon voluntarism,
and such incidental problems as that of ancillary enforcement, will be met
in far fewer cases, that is, only where the Lombard test of state action is
seem to be present in such a case, not because of the existence or enforcement
of the statute, but rather on account of the official, though devious, promotion of
segregation as such.
142. Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases,
apparently had reference to officially sanctioned customs when he observed that
civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression,
cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State
authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings."
(Emphasis added) Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19 (1883); see also, Baldwin v.
Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 1961).
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satisfied. It is true that the Lombard method will take more time than
more extreme solutions. But if it offers a real prospect of success within
a reasonable time, and if it entails fewer undesirable side effects, it ought
to receive favorable consideration. In short, the occasion would seem to
require that zeal for reform be tempered with prudence.
